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Abstract A number of philosophers argue for the value of
abstraction in explanation. According to these prescriptive
theories, an explanation becomes superior when it leaves out
details that make no difference to the occurrence of the event
one is trying to explain (the explanandum). Abstract explana-
tions are not frugal placeholders for improved, detailed future
explanations but are more valuable than their concrete coun-
terparts because they highlight the factors that do the causal
work, the factors in the absence of which the explanandum
would not occur. We present several experiments that test
whether people follow this prescription (i.e., whether people
prefer explanations with abstract difference makers over ex-
planations with concrete details and explanations that omit
descriptively accurate but causally irrelevant information).
Contrary to the prescription, we found a preference for con-
creteness and detail. Participants rated explanations with con-
crete details higher than their abstract counterparts and in
many cases they did not penalize the presence of causally
irrelevant details. Nevertheless, causality still constrained par-
ticipants’ preferences: They downgraded concrete explana-
tions that did not communicate the critical causal properties.
Keywords Explanation . Causal reasoning
What is the difference between a good description and a good
explanation of an event? The former is an enumeration of the
state of affairs at the time and place of the event while the latter
is an account of why or how that event came to be. Consider a
description of a car accident resulting in a pedestrian being
injured. One can describe the location of the accident, the
speed of the car, the conditions of the tires and the road. One
could also refer to the make and color of the car, whether the
car radio was on and even the clothes the driver was wearing,
the color of the victim’s eyes, the number of nearby cars and
pedestrians—an exhaustive array of facts that were true when
the event in question took place. Arguably, the amount of
information contained in a good description is constrained
only by pragmatic considerations: the available time and space
modulated by the needs and patience of the audience.
On the other hand, given that the central aim of explanation
is to provide understanding—be it for purposes of diagnosis,
prediction, or pure aesthetic pleasure (Keil, 2006)—only in-
formation in service of that aim should be included. Arguably,
the color of the driver’s eyes in the above example does not
enhance anyone’s understanding regarding the car accident,
therefore it might be descriptively relevant but it is probably
not explanatorily relevant.
Determining what is explanatorily relevant depends on the
account of explanation one adopts, and philosophers have
long debated the nature of explanation, especially in scientific
practice (Hempel, 1965; Kitcher, 1981; Salmon, 1984;
Strevens, 2008). A parallel question is whether explanation
quality increases as accuracy increases. Unlike a description,
whose quality is often contingent on the precision of its rep-
resentation, there are reasons to believe that Babstracting^ an
explanation (i.e., removing certain details or decreasing its
precision) might in fact improve it.
For some philosophers, abstraction signifies an undesirable
departure from reality. On such views, an ideal explanation
would mention every relevant factor at the highest degree of
precision, but this quickly becomes unattainable either due to
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incomplete knowledge or to practical limitations. Cartwright
(1983) argues that through abstraction, scientific explanations
become false since they apply only in ideal conditions not
found in nature. Railton (1981) argues that abstraction is a fair
compromise, but a compromise nevertheless. For Nowak
(1992), the distance from reality is progressively minimized
by successive scientific theories: Starting from an abstract but
false theory of a phenomenon, progress is achieved by adding
more and more influencing factors and specifying them with
more and more accuracy, such that the theory is brought closer
and closer to reality.
Others, however, attribute value to abstraction. Jorland
(1994), for example, thinks that abstraction improves expla-
nations by leaving out nonessential factors, thus enabling Bone
to grasp the essence^ (p. 274). Garfinkel (1981) explains that
hyperconcrete explanations (i.e., explanations that contain too
much detail) are overly sensitive to slight perturbations.
Explaining an accident by referring to the car’s high speed,
for example, is more robust than referring to the speed and the
color of the driver’s shirt: while the former will explain mul-
tiple accidents, the latter will lead to different explanations for
accidents that occurred at the same speed but in which the
driver wore a blue, red, or purple shirt. Explanations that are
too concrete are not merely Btoo good to be true^ (i.e., imprac-
tical) but rather Btoo true to be good^ (Garfinkel, 1981, p. 58).
Similarly, proponents of causal, and especially counterfac-
tual, theories of explanation (Hitchcock & Woodward, 2003;
Kuorikoski &Ylikoski, 2010; Strevens, 2007;Weslake, 2010)
believe that an explanation can be improved even by leaving
out terms that assert causal influence on the event to be ex-
plained (the explanandum). Specifically, Strevens (2007) ar-
gues that properly abstracted explanations are explanatorily
superior to their concrete and, by definition, more accurate
counterparts by focusing on difference makers (facts or events
in the absence of which the explanandum would not occur).
Thus, the criterion for mentioning a detail when explaining
some phenomenon is whether that detail makes a difference to
the phenomenon’s occurrence. When explaining why it took
approximately 2 seconds for the apple falling from a tree to
reach the ground, even if the gravitational pull from the moon
did exert some influence on the apple, it did not change the
fact that the flight of the apple lasted for approximately the
time it did. On that basis, the removal of lunar influence from
the terms mentioned in the explanation improves its quality. In
short, Strevens (2007) distinguishes causal influence from dif-
ference making and argues that it is difference making that is
key to explanatory quality. In a similar vein, Garfinkel (1981)
points out that explanations are often intended to help the
prevention of future occurrences of the explanandum.
Details that make no difference have no use and may in fact
hinder such practical goals.
Philosophical discussions often focus on explanations as
used in science in an attempt to arrive at normative principles
regarding abstraction. What principles do people use when
evaluating everyday explanations? Is abstraction still valued?
Do people choose to mention the exact speed of the car, or is it
preferable to say that the car was moving fast or that the speed
of the car fell within a certain range of values, all of which
would still lead to the accident? Similarly, does including
causally irrelevant but accurate information, such as the make
of the car or even the color of the driver’s shirt, reduce the
quality of the explanation?
Experimentally, Weisberg, Keil, Goodstein, Rawson, and
Gray (2008) have shown that when judging behavioral expla-
nations, people value the presence of neuroscientific details,
even when these do not do any explanatory work (see also
Fernandez-Duque, Evans, Christian, & Hodges, 2015). Their
hypothesis is that psychological accounts that appeal to neu-
roscience—a lower level discipline dealing with phenomena
that are more microscopic than psychology’s—generate an
unwarranted sense of understanding (Trout, 2008; see also
Hopkins, Weisberg, & Taylor, 2016). Another option, howev-
er, is that people do not have a bias toward neuroscience-based
or even reductionist explanations per se but have a preference
for concretization, for the detail and precision that a lower
level explanation provides. In that case, one would expect to
observe a preference for concreteness even when competing
explanations do not differ in their level of reduction.
In the present set of experiments, we address these ques-
tions by obtaining ratings of competing explanations of every-
day events that differ in the amount of information removed or
abstracted from descriptions. At the extreme is what we call
Birrelevant^ explanations: explanations that contain all the in-
formation present in the description including causally irrele-
vant detail (i.e., information about events that do not plausibly
exert any causal influence on the explanandum).1 The removal
of irrelevant information yields what we call Bconcrete^ ex-
planations, containing only causally relevant information
specified with a high degree of accuracy. Finally, by replacing
precise descriptions with qualitative statements, we have con-
structed Babstract^ explanations that specify only the differ-
ence makers, the events without which the explanandum
would not occur.
Experiments 1a and 1b
Participants were presented with a description of either a land-
slide (Experiment 1a) or a bad strawberry yield (Experiment
1b). To increase the believability of the descriptions, the
1 By this definition, we are intentionally exaggerating what philosophers, es-
pecially those adopting a causal account of explanation, designate as explan-
atorily irrelevant information. Our Birrelevant^ explanations include details
with no plausible causal relation to the explanandum, in an attempt to generate
more pronounced differences between the explanations that participants were
presented.
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stories were presented as newspaper reports (see Fig. 1). In
addition, although the stories were made up, the information
we used was copied from various specialized sources (e.g.,
geological surveys, pest management reports). After reading
the report, participants were asked to rate the quality of three
explanations that differed in their degree of concreteness (ir-
relevant, concrete, and abstract).
Following the philosophical views on the importance of
causality and counterfactual dependence in explanation
(Garfinkel, 1981; Hitchcock & Woodward, 2003; Strevens,
2007), we expected noncausally related details to be penalized
by participants. Furthermore, given the level at which the
question was posed (BWhy was there a landslide?^ rather than
BWhy did the landslide happen in this particular way?^), we
expected participants to penalize details that had a causal in-
fluence but did not make a difference as to whether or not the
landslide occurred, such as the exact diameter of soil particles.
In contrast, if the tendency toward reductionism (Trout, 2008;
Weisberg et al., 2008) is actually a particular case of a more
general tendency for accuracy, then people should prefer the
more detailed explanations.2
Participants and materials
We recruited 61 participants for each of Experiments 1a and
1b through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. The mean age was
32.9 years (SD = 11.6) in Experiment 1a and 31.7 years (SD =
11.1) in Experiment 1b. There were 35 females (57.4%) in
Experiment 1a and 34 (55.7%) in Experiment 1b. In this and
all experiments, participants were paid $0.50 for taking part,
and the experiments were programmed in Adobe Flex 4.6 and
conducted over the Internet (all experiments and the collected
raw data can be seen at http://goo.gl/0rMOQd).
Design and procedure
All participants rated all three explanations. After two intro-
ductory screens that welcomed participants and asked them to
minimize disturbances during the experiment, participants
saw the description of a landslide (Experiment 1a) or a straw-
berry harvest (Experiment 1b) presented as a newspaper report
(see Fig. 1).
The landslide report included some noncritical information
aimed at increasing the believability of the report (e.g., BRoad
crews have begun the cleanup effort^). The main causal fac-
tors were the slope, the consistency, and the vegetation of the
hill. Three additional causally irrelevant facts described the
color of the hill’s particles, the edibility of the vegetation,
and the position of the hill relative to the premises of a local
festival.3
Similarly, the strawberry report initially mentioned the
strawberry market growth and went on to describe a bad
strawberry season by referring to the temperature, the attacks
of a strawberry bug, and the winds during ripening. The three
causally irrelevant details with respect to the poor strawberry
harvest were the size of the bug, the direction of the winds,
and the color of the strawberry flowers.
In the next screen, participants were asked, based on the
information contained in the newspaper report, to rate the
quality of the three explanations by placing a marker on sliders
that ranged from poor to excellent. The way explanations
should be rated was left intentionally vague as we wanted
participants to apply their own intuitive criteria. To make sure
that participants were not treating the question as a memory
test, the critical information from the newspaper report was
repeated in this screen. The order in which explanations ap-
peared on the screen was randomized for each participant.
The three explanations (see Table 1) differed in their degree
of concreteness: They either repeated, omitted, or altered the
information contained in the original newspaper report. In
each scenario, six facts were manipulated. Three facts were
included unchanged in the concrete and the irrelevant expla-
nations but were abstracted in the abstract explanation.
Another three were included only in the irrelevant explanation
and were omitted from both the concrete and the abstract
explanations. Thus, there were two critical comparisons: one
between the concrete and the abstract explanations, with the
latter containing the same information at a higher level of
abstraction, and a second comparison between concrete and
irrelevant explanations that differed only in the three addition-
al but causally irrelevant facts contained in the latter.
After rating the three explanations, participants were asked
to report the causal relevance of each of the terms used in the
explanations. For each of the nine terms (three concrete, three
abstract, three irrelevant), participants were asked two ques-
tions intended to test whether causal relevance guides the
evaluation of explanations: Did they agree with the assertion
that the term Bwas a cause of the landslide/poor strawberry
production^ (henceforth: causal ratings), and did they agree
with the assertion that the term Baffected the particular way in
which the landslide happened^/Baffected particular aspects of
this year’s poor strawberry production^ (henceforth: causal
influence ratings)? These questions also served as a validity
check: They allowed us to verify whether our designation of
certain terms as causally irrelevant agreed with people’s intu-
itions. The two versions of the causal question (causality and
2 In certain circumstances, people might prefer reductionist or concrete expla-
nations because the explanandum warrants such a choice (i.e., because the
explanatory work is in fact achieved by lower level or more concrete details).
In this manuscript, however, we focus on information that most people would
agree has no influence on the explanandum.
3 While designing the experiment we had to rely on our intuitions regarding
what type of facts are irrelevant to the explanandum. Given that participants
could very well disagree with these intuitions, we asked them to rate the causal
relevance of each factor at the end of the experiment, as will be shortly
discussed.
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causal influence) were meant to capture potential differences
between Bwhat^ and Bhow^ causation (Gerstenberg,
Goodman, Lagnado, & Tenenbaum, 2015). In other words,
it may be the case that participants prefer concrete terms
(e.g., 37 degrees slope) rather than abstract terms (e.g., steep
slope), even though both adequately explain what happened
(e.g., a landslide), because only the concrete term explains
exactly how it happened, despite the fact this is not what is
being asked.
Results
As shown in Fig. 2, the abstract explanations received the
lowest ratings, while concrete and irrelevant explanations re-
ceived roughly equal ratings. The pattern of results is identical
in both experiments with a significant effect of explanation
type: F(1.79, 107.5) = 6.23, p = .004, η2 = 0.07, for
Experiment 1a, and F(1.65, 99.1) = 8.35, p = .001, η2 = 0.1,
for Experiment 1b.
Follow-up paired t tests (Bonferroni adjusted) show no
difference between concrete and irrelevant explanations for
either experiment but a highly significant difference between
concrete and abstract in both Experiment 1a, t(60) = 3.69, p <
.001, d = 0.47, and Experiment 1b, t(60) = 4.12, p < .001, d =
0.53. Finally, irrelevant explanations were rated significantly
higher than abstract in both Experiment 1a, t(60) = 2.36, p =
.02, d = 0.3, and Experiment 1b, t(60) = 3.12, p = .003, d = 0.4.
In both experiments, the same pattern of causal ratings and
causal influence ratings was observed (see Fig. 3). Repeated-
measures tests were highly significant on every occasion:
F(1.7, 102.1) = 160.5, p < .001, η2 = .55, for causal ratings
in Experiment 1a; F(1.62, 97.06) = 196.7, p < .001, for causal
influence ratings in Experiment 1a; F(1.19, 71.15) = 189.8, p
< .001, η2 = .62, for causal ratings in Experiment 1b; and
F(1.21, 72.65) = 141.8, p < .001, η2 = .6, for causal influence
ratings in Experiment 1b.
Participants rated irrelevant factors significantly lower than
concrete factors both when asked whether the factor caused
the explanandum (p < .001 in both experiments) and when
asked whether it influenced aspects of the explanandum (p <
.001 in both experiments). Irrelevant factors were also rated
lower than abstract factors in both direct causal questions (p <
.001 in both experiments) and causal influence questions (p <
.001 in both experiments).
Finally, although abstract factors were rated higher than
concrete factors, this difference was generally not significant,
with one exception: In Experiment 1a, when asked whether
each of the factors caused the landslide, participants were
more likely to report that abstract factors (fine particles, steep
slope, sparse vegetation) were more causally responsible than
concrete factors (particles with diameter 2/64 of an inch, 37
degrees slope, 13% vegetation coverage) at a significant level
(p = .004).
Discussion
In contrast to what difference-making accounts of explanation
propose regarding abstraction (Hitchcock & Woodward,
2003; Strevens, 2007), the findings of Experiment 1 indicate
a preference for detail, even in cases in which detail is not
judged to be causally relevant to the explanandum.4
Explanations in which the causal terms were abstracted re-
ceived consistently lower ratings than explanations mention-
ing exact values. Yet when asked about the causal role of the
4 Some important differences between the types of explanations that common-
ly appear in philosophical discourse and the current work will be discussed in
the General Discussion section.
Fig. 1 Stimuli used in Experiments 1a (left) and 1b (right). The information contained in the right column of each picture was shown again when
participants were asked to rate the explanations
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factors that featured in each explanation, participants rated
concrete and abstract factors equally highly, with abstract fac-
tors receiving significantly higher causal ratings on one occa-
sion. Similarly, participants did not penalize the presence of
irrelevant factors in explanations, despite the fact that they
judged those factors to have minimal causal relation to the
explanandum.
One question arising from these results is the role of
causation in the way people evaluate explanations. Given
the long philosophical tradition connecting causation and
explanation (Psillos, 2002; Salmon, 1984; Woodward,
2003), it is surprising that the potency of each factor to
bring about the explanandum was not the main determi-
nant of the way the explanations were evaluated. The
abstract terms, although equally efficacious, resulted in
weaker explanations, while, conversely, causally irrele-
vant factors did not weaken the explanations.
It might be argued that, at least for some comparisons,
it was not concreteness per se that guided participants but
the presence of numerical values as indication of expla-
nation quality. For that reason, we conducted an addition-
al experiment, not reported here, using the same materials
as in Experiment 1 but where abstract explanations in-
cluded numerical ranges. Thus, the term Blow tempera-
ture,^ for example, was changed to Blow temperature (0–
5 degrees Celsius).^ Ratings for abstract explanations
were unchanged, as were the overall comparisons that
we have reported here.
There are several other ways to understand our find-
ings. Concreteness might signal the expertise or the truth-
fulness of the person providing the explanation (Bell &
Loftus, 1985, 1989). Alternatively, it might be that the
description of the exact conditions in which an event oc-
curred facilitates understanding other aspects of the situ-
ation, thus achieving better unification (Kitcher, 1981).
For example, the fact that the accident one is trying to
explain took place close to the hospital, although not
causally relevant to the accident itself, might explain other
aspects of the event, such as the swift arrival of the am-
bulance. Before further discussing ways to account for our
results, the next set of experiments will reevaluate the
current findings in a simpler and more controlled context.
Experiments 2a and 2b
The second experiment aimed for a more controlled investi-
gation of the surprising findings obtained in Experiment 1.
That experiment had the benefit of ecological validity but
had only two scenarios and used only explanations of natural
phenomena. Finally, the explanations incorporated multiple
factors that could have interacted in complex ways. With that
in mind, the following experiments used short explanations
for multiple everyday events that varied only a single factor
and included social as well as physical phenomena.
Participants and materials
Sixty-one participants were recruited through Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk for Experiment 2a and 60 for Experiment
2b. The mean age was 33.0 years (SD = 9.2) in Experiment 2a
and 34.6 years (SD = 11.2) in Experiment 2b. There were 25
Table 1 The three types of explanations used in Experiments 1a and
1b. Highlighted in bold here but not in the actual experiment are the
differences between the explanations
Experiment 1a Experiment 1b
Abstract The fact that the hill consisted
mainly of fine sandy
particles meant that the soil
was unstable. The sparse
vegetation did not
withhold the rainwater
causing soil erosion.
Finally, the force of gravity
acting down the steep
slope overcame the
resistance of friction, thus
triggering the landslide.
The fact that the mean
temperature when the
strawberry flowers started
to grow was very low
caused some of the plants
to freeze. The significant
increase in attacks by the
strawberry bug, which lays
eggs on the leaves, stopped
the development of many
plants. Finally, the
extremely strong winds
uprooted many plants off
their shallow roots.
Concrete The fact that the hill consisted
mainly of sandy particles
with diameters 2/64 of an
inchmeant that the soil was
unstable. The vegetation
covering 13% of the hill
did not withhold the
rainwater, causing soil
erosion. Finally, the force
of gravity acting down the
37 degree slope overcame
the resistance of friction,
thus triggering the
landslide.
The fact that the mean
temperature when the
strawberry flowers started
to grow was 2 degrees
Celsius caused some of the
plants to freeze. The 27%
increase in attacks by the
strawberry bug, which lays
eggs on the leaves, stopped
the development of many
plants. Finally, the 77-mph
winds uprooted many
plants off their shallow
roots.
Irrelevant The fact that the hill, which
was 5 miles north of the
premises of the annual
Lilac festival, consisted
mainly of light brown
sandy particles with
diameters 2/64 of an inch
meant that the soil was
unstable. The nonedible
vegetation covering 13%
of the hill did not withhold
the rainwater, causing soil
erosion. Finally, the force
of gravity acting down the
37 degree slope overcame
the resistance of friction,
thus triggering the
landslide.
The fact that the mean
temperature when the
white strawberry flowers
started to grow was 2
degrees Celsius caused
some of the plants to
freeze. The 27% increase
in attacks by the 0.25-mm
strawberry bug, which lays
eggs on the leaves, stopped
the development of many
plants. Finally, the 77-mph
winds blowing from the
east uprooted many plants
off their shallow roots.
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females (41.0%) in Experiment 2a and 26 (43.3%) in
Experiment 2b.
Design and procedure
Experiment 2a compared concrete to irrelevant explanations,
and Experiment 2b compared concrete to abstract explana-
tions. In each case, the two explanations differed by a single
detail.
Both experiments had a 12 (scenario) × 2 (explanation
type) repeated-measures design. After a few introductory
screens, participants were asked to rate two explanations for
each of 12 everyday events.5 Each screen presented the de-
scription of the event to be explained, a question specifying
the explanandum and two explanations, each followed by a
slider ranging from poor to excellent. The order of the events
to be explained was randomized as well as the left-right posi-
tion of the two explanations for each event.
In Experiment 2a, the two explanation types (concrete and
irrelevant) were identical apart from the fact that the irrelevant
explanation contained an extra detail that had no causal con-
nection to the explanandum. For example, one of the stories
described Michael’s road accident, mentioning that Michael
had drunk eight vodka shots and three glasses of gin and tonic
at Joe’s bar and asking, BWhy did Michael have an accident?^
The concrete version explained the accident by saying that the
eight vodka shots and the three glasses of gin and tonic that
Michael consumed severely reduced his concentration and
increased his reaction time. The irrelevant explanation was
identical, except that it also mentioned that Michael consumed
the drinks at Joe’s bar.
Experiment 2b compared concrete and abstract explana-
tions for the 12 scenarios.While the concrete versions referred
to the exact values or quantities that were mentioned in the
scenarios, the abstract explanations used a higher level of de-
scription for the critical term. For example, in the story of
Michael’s accident, the concrete explanation was identical to
the one used in Experiment 2a, while the abstract explanation
mentioned that Michael had consumed Ban excessive amount
of alcohol^ instead of the particular drink types and quantities.
Results
In Experiment 2a, the average rating for concrete explanations
(M = 76.23, SE = .75) was higher than the rating for irrelevant
explanations (M = 69.65, SE = .85). A repeated-measures
ANOVA revealed a significant main effect for both the
5 The complete list of scenarios and explanations used in Experiments 2a and
2b can be found in Appendix A.
Fig. 2 Mean explanation ratings for the three types of explanations in Experiments 1a and 1b averaged over participants (error bars represent 95% CI)
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scenario, F(7.16, 429.8) = 3.94, p < .001, η2 = .02, and the
explanation type, F(1, 60) = 9.61, p < .001, η2 = .02, as well as
their interaction, F(7.99, 479.4) = 3.94, p < .001, η2 = .02.
Although there were variations between scenarios, partici-
pants rated only two of 12 irrelevant explanations higher than
their concrete counterparts.
Similarly, clear results were observed in Experiment 2b
with participants rating concrete explanations (M = 77.07,
SE = .85) higher than abstract explanations (M = 67.26, SE
= .90). Again, a repeated-measures ANOVA revealed a sig-
nificant main effect for both the scenario, F(8.40, 495.3) =
6.53, p < .001, η2 = .02, and the explanation type, F(1, 59)
= 22.09, p < .001, η2 = .04, as well as their interaction, F(6.46,
381.2) = 6.22, p < .001, η2 = .04. The preference for concrete
explanations was true for all but two scenarios.
Discussion
The current results replicated people’s preference for con-
crete explanations but also showed that causally irrelevant
details made explanations less appealing. In the vast ma-
jority of the scenarios, participants gave higher ratings to
explanations that contained particular details rather than
abstracted versions of those details. Unlike Experiment 1,
explanations were rated significantly lower when they
contained causally irrelevant information.
Apart from using different scenarios, there are two candidate
explanations for the discrepancy between Experiments 1a and
2a in the way irrelevant details were treated. An important
difference is that each irrelevant explanation in Experiments
1a and 1b contained three causally irrelevant details rather than
one, as in Experiment 2a. Perhaps discarding three details
removes too much information from the explanations, even if
that information is not causally connected to the explanandum.
Alternatively, the simultaneous presentation of three
(Experiment 1) rather than two (Experiment 2) competing ex-
planations might have led to attraction effects (Huber, Payne, &
Puto, 1982) in Experiment 1. A strong preference for concrete
over abstract explanations in Experiment 1 might have increased
the ratings for irrelevant explanations that contained the same
concrete descriptions. This is consistent with the fact that the
difference between concrete and irrelevant explanations in
Experiment 2a was smaller than the difference between concrete
and abstract explanations in Experiment 2b. Removing detail
through abstraction may be less desirable than removing irrele-
vant detail.
Fig. 3 Mean values for causal ratings (i.e., BX caused the landslide/poor strawberry yield^) and causal influence ratings (i.e., BX affected the particular
way in which the landslide happened^/BX affected particular aspects of this year’s poor strawberry production^) averaged over participants
Psychon Bull Rev
Both proposed accounts, together with the fact that irrele-
vant explanations still received high ratings (significantly
higher than the midpoint) and the reluctance to abstract away,
suggest that concreteness and accuracy are valued properties
of explanations. However, the possibility remains that good
explanations must appeal to causality. After all, the critical
causal property was presumably inferred even in the concrete
explanations of Experiment 2. For example, Beight vodka
shots and the three glasses of gin and tonic^ is for most people
an Bexcessive amount of alcohol.^ So the former phrase both
communicates the difference maker and provides specific de-
tails. But the expression of detail appears to be important too.
Admittedly, there are many ways to transform a concrete
explanation to an abstract one, as there are a wide variety of
details one can add to an abstract explanation. Our results are
surely influenced by some of our choices. There is no easy
way to counteract this issue besides conducting further work
and testing more variables. In this direction, the next pair of
experiments radically changes the type of concrete informa-
tion that is included. We assess the role of causation by testing
whether people continue to prefer concreteness even when
critical causal properties are not communicated.
Experiments 3a and 3b
The aim of the final set of experiments is twofold. First, we
wish to see if people’s attitude to causally irrelevant details
generalizes to a different set of scenarios. Second, we will
assess people’s preference for concreteness over abstraction
in cases where concrete details fail to transmit the causally
critical properties, allowing us to evaluate the perceived im-
portance of causality in explanation.
Participants and material
There were 44 participants in Experiment 3a and 36 in
Experiment 3b, recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical
Turk. The mean age was 30.6 years (SD = 8.37) in
Experiment 3a and 33.0 years (SD = 9.44) in Experiment
3b. There were 18 females (40.9%) in Experiment 3a and 10
(27.8%) in Experiment 3b.
Design and procedure
Experiments 3a and 3b used a different set of scenarios,6 but
the design was identical to Experiments 2a and 2b. However,
in Experiment 3b, abstract and concrete explanations differed
along a second dimension: In the absence of specialized
knowledge, the concrete term did not communicate the causal
properties that bring about the explanandum either because
the term itself was obscure or because it used a relatively
unknown scale. In contrast, the abstract explanation men-
tioned either the category or a qualitative property. For exam-
ple, to explain a fire in a warehouse, the concrete explanation
attributed the fire to the presence of ethyl chloride while the
abstract explanation referred to a highly flammable material.
Similarly, to explain someone’s respiratory problems, the con-
crete explanation mentioned the presence of carbon dioxide at
a level of 3,000 ppm while the abstract explanation referred to
a very high level of carbon dioxide.
Results
In Experiment 3a, the concrete (M = 74.66, SE = .93) and
irrelevant (M = 73.71, SE = 1.04) explanations received ap-
proximately equal ratings across scenarios. A repeated-
measures ANOVA was significant only for scenario, F(7.42,
319.04) = 2.38, p = .02, η2=.01, and the interaction term,
F(6.15, 264.7) = 5.23, p < .001, η2 = .04 but not for explana-
tion type (p = .747). A closer look at individual scenarios
shows that concrete explanations were rated higher in six of
12 cases.
In Experiment 3b, participants preferred abstract (M =
82.50, SE = 1.12) over concrete explanations (M = 68.18,
SE = 1.33). There was a significant effect for the scenario,
F(7.26, 254.2) = 3.93, p < .001, η2 = 0.02, the explanation
type, F(1, 35) = 10.18, p = .003, η2 = 0.08, and their interac-
tion, F(6.35, 222.4) = 4.52, p < .001, η2 = .04. Abstract ex-
planations were preferred in 11 of 12 scenarios.
Discussion
In Experiment 3a, irrelevant details were not penalized as was
the case in Experiments 1a and 1b. This rules out accounts
based on attraction effects or the number of details included in
explanations, discussed earlier.
Experiment 3b shows that the preference for concreteness
that was observed in previous experiments does not persist
when the concrete terms fail to communicate the causal prop-
erties of the event that brought about the explanandum.
Although concrete explanations are still rated significantly
higher than the midpoint, people prefer explanations that con-
vey causal information as predicted by causal accounts of
explanation (Salmon, 1984; Woodward, 2003).
General discussion
We have investigated the extent to which people prefer expla-
nations that present an accurate account of the state of affairs
at the time of the explanandum or, alternatively, whether ab-
straction improves the perceived quality of explanations. In
6 The complete list of scenarios and explanations used in Experiments 3a and
3b can be found in Appendix B.
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our experiments, abstract explanations either removed infor-
mation that had no causal relation to the explanandum or
replaced precise terms with more abstract ones that highlight-
ed difference-making properties.
In violation of certain philosophical prescriptions
(Garfinkel, 1981; Hitchcock & Woodward, 2003; Strevens,
2007; Weslake, 2010), abstraction is not in itself a desirable
feature of an explanation. It becomes the preferred option only
when it improves the communication of causal properties. In
our experiments, people show a tendency for concreteness as
long as the causal properties are not obscured by technical
terms. Therefore, although causality appears to be a necessary
property of a good explanation, causal terms are not selected
based on their difference-making properties but rather on how
accurately they match the events that took place.
Because people attend to whether the explanation offers a
causal property, one might expect that details that are not caus-
ally related to the explanandum would reduce an explanation’s
judged quality. Our results on this question were mixed, but
some conclusions can be drawn. In two out of three experi-
ments presented here, participants rated irrelevant explanations
as high as concrete ones. Even though in Experiment 2a expla-
nations without irrelevant details were preferred, ratings for
irrelevant explanations significantly exceeded the midpoint in
every scenario that we have tried. Causally irrelevant informa-
tion is not penalized as strongly as one might expect. Since
recent philosophical prescriptions (Strevens, 2007) suggest
the removal even of factors that exert causal influence on the
explanandum, provided these are not difference makers, the
reluctance of our participants to penalize even causally irrele-
vant factors indicates a misalignment between the proposed
normative principles and actual everyday practice.
Our findings extend the endorsement of concreteness and
detail beyond the domain of neuroscience (Weisberg et al.,
2008). They also extend it beyond the scope of reductionism
(Hopkins et al., 2016; Trout, 2008). The competing explana-
tions in our experiments did not differ in level of analysis. For
example, causally irrelevant details, such as the edibility of the
vegetation at a hill where a landslide occurred (Experiment
1a), are not more microscopic but simply more descriptive of
the events that are being explained, yet participants did not
penalize their presence in explanations.
In contrast to the current set of studies, the majority of
philosophical work is concerned with explanations of law-
like regularities.7 As a result, rather than evaluating explana-
tions for token events, like a landslide at a particular location,
most normative accounts assess explanations of type events,
such as the natural phenomenon of landslides. It remains an
open question how people would evaluate explanations of
such regularities and whether explanations that appealed only
to difference makers would, in those cases, be preferred.
More generally, although the current results point toward a
preference for detail, it is reasonable to assume that this might
depend on a variety of factors, such as the type of phenomena
and the type of concrete details, the way the explanation is
abstracted or concretized, as well as the interests of the receiv-
er and their assumed background knowledge. We already saw
in Experiment 3b, for example, that concrete details are not
preferred when they fail to communicate the critical causal
properties. Similarly, it is plausible that for certain types of
properties (e.g., functional properties) there could be a stron-
ger preference for abstraction. All these are open possibilities
with further work required to decide whether the bias for con-
creteness is in fact universal or whether a mixed model where
detail is sometimes preferred and other times penalized is
more appropriate.
Given our observations, a pressing question is what underlies
the observed preference for concreteness that leads to deviations
from philosophical prescriptions. Our experiments inspire a few
conjectures. Abstract explanations are more generalizable by
retaining only the essence of the causal mechanism (Jorland,
1994; Nowak, 1992) and facilitating prediction. Detailed expla-
nations, on the other hand, provide more information about the
particular instance. This is more useful for understanding and
perhaps explaining additional aspects of the particular instance
(Kitcher, 1981; Strevens, 2007). Therefore, it might be the case
that preferences regarding explanations depend on one’s aims.
For example, referring back to our car accident example, a policy
maker aims to prevent further accidents, while an insurance
agent aims to understand as many aspects of the accident as
possible. The former might show a preference for abstract, gen-
eralizable explanations due to their potentially preventative role
(Garfinkel, 1981), while the latter might prefer explanations with
concrete details that can prove useful when processing the insur-
ance claim. Thus, the tendency toward precision might be ex-
plained by participants defaulting to a more backwards-looking
stance toward explanations.
Similarly, irrelevant details might have helped participants
visualize how the explanandum came to be. The fact, for exam-
ple, that someone suffered from respiratory problems is ade-
quately explained by his exposure to high levels of carbon diox-
ide, irrespective of whether or not this exposure took place in the
school where he works (Experiment 3a). This causally irrelevant
information, however, helps one imagine themechanism that led
to the explanandum, which by itself might promote a feeling of
understanding and, moreover, explain why children were endan-
gered or why a legal case was brought against the builder.
What is apparent is that people do not adhere to the norma-
tive principles put forward by some philosophers. Explanations
in everyday usage serve goals beyond uncovering how an
explanandum came to be. These goals are better served through
detail and accuracy, making abstraction a less than ideal option.
7 Strevens, however, thinks the process of abstraction yields superior explana-
tions not only of laws but also of Bongoing states of affairs, ‘effects’, and other
generalizations^ (Strevens, 2007, p. 7).
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Appendix A: Stimuli used in Experiments 2a and 2b
1. Exam
Peter failed his bar examination. He used to study on
average for 30 minutes per day in his office.
& Why did Peter fail the exam?
– Concrete: Because studying for 30 minutes per day
on average was insufficient for understanding and
remembering the various topics on which he was
examined.
– Abstract: Because studying for less than 5 hours a
day on average was insufficient for understanding
and remembering the various topics on which he
was examined.
– Irrelevant: Because studying for 30 minutes per day
on average in his office was insufficient for under-
standing and remembering the various topics on
which he was examined.
2. Laptop
Mary’s laptop failed to start after she spilled a
bottle containing 340 ml of sparkling water on the
keyboard.
& Why did Mary’s laptop fail to start?
– Concrete: Because the 340 ml of water that was
spilled on the keyboard reached the laptop’s battery
and reacted with the battery’s alkaline elements,
thus destroying the laptop.
– Abstract: Because the large amount of water that
was spilled on the keyboard reached the laptop’s
battery and reacted with the battery’s alkaline ele-
ments, thus destroying the laptop.
– Irrelevant: Because the 340 ml of sparkling wa-
ter that was spilled on the keyboard reached
the laptop’s battery and reacted with the
battery’s alkaline elements, thus destroying
the laptop.
3. Holidays
Paul did not enjoy his holidays. During his stay there
were winds with average speed of 46 mph around his 5-
star resort.
& Why did not Paul enjoy his holidays?
– Concrete: Because the 46-mph winds blowing
around his resort prevented him from swimming
in the sea or, even, relaxing at the beach.
– Abstract: Because the strong winds blowing around
his resort prevented him from swimming in the sea
or, even, relaxing at the beach.
– Irrelevant: Because the 46-mph winds blowing
around his 5-star resort prevented him from swim-
ming in the sea or, even, relaxing at beach.
4. Plant
John’s plant died. The plant that was decorating
John’s bedroom was left without water for 300 days.
& Why did John’s plant die?
– Concrete: Because plants need water to photosyn-
thesize (i.e., to create their food), and John’s plant
was left without water for 300 days; thus, it starved.
– Abstract: Because plants needwater to photosynthe-
size (i.e., to create their food), and John’s plant was
left without water for more than 60 days; thus, it
starved.
– Irrelevant: Because plants need water to photosyn-
thesize (i.e., to create their food), and John’s plant,
which was decorating his bedroom, was left without
water for 300 days; thus, it starved.
5. Cake
Lucia’s cake was a disaster. The cake has been in
Lucia’s oven for 9 hours.
& Why was Lucia’s cake ruined?
– Concrete: Because the cake was left in the oven for
9 hours, and thus it was completely burnt.
– Abstract: Because the cake was left in the oven for a
very long time, and thus it was completely burnt.
– Irrelevant: Because the cake was left in Lucia’s oven
for 9 hours, and thus it was completely burnt.
6. Accident
Michael had a road accident. He had drunk eight vod-
ka shots and three glasses of gin and tonic at Joe’s bar.
& Why did Michael have an accident?
– Concrete: Because the eight vodka shots and the
three glasses of gin and tonic that Michael con-
sumed severely reduced his concentration and in-
creased his reaction time.
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– Abstract: Because the excessive amount of alcohol
that Michael consumed severely reduced his con-
centration and increased his reaction time.
– Irrelevant: Because the eight vodka shots and the
three glasses of gin and tonic that Michael con-
sumed at Joe’s bar severely reduced his concentra-
tion and increased his reaction time.
7. Job
Kevin’s application for a job was unsuccessful. He
sent his application via priority mail 35 days after the
application deadline.
& Why was Kevin’s application unsuccessful?
– Concrete: Because his application was sent 35 days
after the deadline, and thus he was not even consid-
ered for the position.
– Abstract: Because his application was sent long af-
ter the deadline, and thus he was not even consid-
ered for the position.
– Irrelevant: Because his application was sent via pri-
ority mail 35 days after the deadline, and thus he
was not even considered for the position.
8. Lake
Llyn Dinas, a lake near Beddgelert in north Wales,
has frozen. The water temperature in the lake that is
famous for its trout fishing was 14 degrees Fahrenheit.
& Why did the lake freeze?
– Concrete: Because, since the temperature of the lake
was 14 degrees Fahrenheit, the lake’s water mole-
cules were all locked together, forming ice.
– Abstract: Because, since the temperature of the lake
was below 32 degrees Fahrenheit, the lake’s water
molecules were all locked together, forming ice.
– Irrelevant: Because, since the temperature of the
lake that is famous for its trout fishing was 14 de-
grees Fahrenheit, the lake’s water molecules were
all locked together, forming ice.
9. Bleeding
Tina’s finger was bleeding heavily. She had cut her
finger ¼ inches deep with a kitchen knife.
& Why did Tina’s finger bleed heavily?
– Concrete: Because the ¼-inch deep cut damaged
blood vessels that carry blood under high pressure.
– Abstract: Because the nonsuperficial cut damaged
blood vessels that carry blood under high pressure.
– Irrelevant: Because the ¼-inch deep cut by the
kitchen knife damaged blood vessels that carry
blood under high pressure.
10. Inflation
The rate of inflation has increased. Earlier in the year,
the left-wing government has raised the sales tax by
10%.
& Why did the rate of inflation increase?
– Concrete: Because the 10% raise of the sales tax has
led to higher prices of consumer goods, which is
essentially what inflation measures.
– Abstract: Because the significant raise of the sales
tax has led to higher prices of consumer goods,
which is essentially what inflation measures.
– Irrelevant: Because the 10% raise of the sales tax by
the left-wing government has led to higher prices of
consumer goods, which is essentially what inflation
measures.
11. Battle
In the Battle of Thermopylae in 480 BC, the Greeks
were defeated by the Persians. In the battle, that took
place close to the city of Trachis, the Greek army was
about 7,000 men while the Persian army numbered
130,000 soldiers.
& Why was the Greek army defeated?
– Concrete: Because during the battle, the Persian ar-
my outnumbered the Greek army by 123,000
soldiers.
– Abstract: Because during the battle, the Persian ar-
my vastly outnumbered the Greek army.
– Irrelevant: Because during the battle that took place
close to the city of Trachis, the Persian army
outnumbered the Greek army by 123,000 soldiers.
12. Elections
In the last German elections, the Free Democrats
(FDP) failed to meet the 5% vote threshold required to
enter the parliament. The party, which was established in
1948, secured 4.8% of the vote.
& Why did the FDP fail to enter the German
parliament?
– Concrete: Because the party won 0.2% fewer votes
than required to exceed the threshold.
– Abstract: Because the party won fewer votes than
required to exceed the threshold.
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– Irrelevant: Because the party that was established in
1948 won 0.2% less than required to exceed the
threshold.
Appendix B: Stimuli used in Experiments 3a and 3b
1. Respiratory
Peter was suffering from respiratory problems. The
concentration of carbon dioxide in the school where he
was teaching was regularly at the very high level of
3,000 ppm.
& Why was Peter suffering from respiratory problems?
– Concrete: Because he was regularly exposed to car-
bon dioxide at the level of 3,000 ppm.
– Irrelevant: Because he was regularly exposed to car-
bon dioxide at the level of 3,000 ppm at the school
where he was teaching.
– Abstract: Because he was regularly exposed to a
very high level of carbon dioxide.
2. Club
Melissa had a headache after leaving the night club.
The music in the recently renovated club was playing
extremely loudly at 120 dBA SPL.
& Why did Melissa have a headache?
– Concrete: Because the music in the club was
playing at 120 dBA SPL.
– Irrelevant: Because the music in the recently reno-
vated club was playing at 120 dBA SPL.
– Abstract: Because the music in the club was playing
extremely loudly.
3. Welfare
Hospitals across the country struggled to cope with
demand. The government had severely reduced the
health-care budget by 2.4%, contrary to what was prom-
ised before the elections.
& Why did the hospitals struggle to cope with demand?
– Concrete: Because the government had reduced the
health-care budget by 2.4%.
– Irrelevant: Because, contrary to what was promised
before the elections, the government had reduced
the health-care budget by 2.4%.
– Abstract: Because the government had severely re-
duced the health-care budget.
4. Holidays
Paul did not enjoy his holidays. During his stay, there
were strong winds with average speed of 46 mph blow-
ing from the west, which prevented Paul from enjoying
the beach.
& Why did not Paul enjoy his holidays?
– Concrete: Because the 46-mph winds prevented
him from enjoying the beach.
– Irrelevant: Because the 46-mphwinds blowing from
the west prevented him from enjoying the beach.
– Abstract: Because the strong winds prevented him
from enjoying the beach.
5. Flood
Larry’s house was flooded. The Yare river, which is
nearby, has overflown for the third time in that year.
& Why was Larry’s house flooded?
– Concrete: Because Yare, which is nearby, could not
withhold the water.
– Irrelevant: Because Yare, which is nearby, could not
withhold the water for the third time in that year.
– Abstract: Because a river, which is nearby, could not
withhold the water.
6. Medical
Daniel was stressed. The outcome of the scintig-
raphy medical test that he had 5 days earlier was
positive.
& Why was Daniel stressed?
– Concrete: Because the outcome of his scintigraphy
was positive.
– Irrelevant: Because the outcome of the scintigraphy
that he had 5 days earlier was positive.
– Abstract: Because the outcome of his medical test
was positive.
7. Nausea
Mary was feeling very nauseated. She had acciden-
tally ingested 8 grams of paracetamol, much more than
the recommended maximum daily dose.
& Why was Mary feeling very nauseated?
– Concrete: Because she had ingested 8 grams of
paracetamol.
– Irrelevant: Because she had accidentally ingested 8
grams of paracetamol.
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– Abstract: Because she had overdosed on
paracetamol.
8. Landslide
There was a landslide at the hill close to David’s
house. Throughout the cold winter day, intense rain
was falling at the rate of 0.63 inches per hour.
& Why was there a landslide close to David’s house?
– Concrete: Because, throughout the day, rain was
falling at the rate of 0.63 inches per hour.
– Irrelevant: Because, throughout the cold winter day,
rain was falling at the rate of 0.63 inches per hour.
– Abstract: Because, throughout the day, intense rain
was falling.
9. Fire
A large fire destroyed the warehouse. Around noon
on a very hot day, at a time when many people were still
working, a large quantity of the very flammable ethyl
chloride was being transported in the warehouse.
& Why was there a fire in the warehouse?
– Concrete: Because a large quantity of ethyl chloride
was being transported in the warehouse at a time
when the temperature was very high.
– Irrelevant: Because a large quantity of ethyl chloride
was being transported in the warehouse at a time
when the temperature was very high and many peo-
ple were still working.
– Abstract: Because a large quantity of a very flam-
mable material was being transported in the ware-
house at a time when the temperature was very high.
10. Strawberry
Barbara’s strawberry yield was very poor that year.
The strawberries that were planted in early autumn
attracted the leaf-eating tarsonemid mite.
& Why was Barbara’s strawberry yield poor that year?
– Concrete: Because her strawberries attracted the
tarsonemid mite.
– Irrelevant: Because her strawberries that were planted
in early autumn attracted the tarsonemid mite.
– Abstract: Because her strawberries attracted a leaf-
eating mite.
11. TV
Kevin’s TV had no picture even though it did have
sound. The cold-cathode florescent lamp, a component
present in LCD TVs and used to generate light, was
malfunctioning.
& Why did Kevin’s TV have no picture even though it
did have sound?
– Concrete: Because the cold-cathode florescent lamp
was malfunctioning.
– Irrelevant: Because the cold-cathode florescent
lamp, a component present in LCD TVs, was
malfunctioning.
– Abstract: Because the component used to generate
light was malfunctioning.
12. Accident
John had a car accident. He was driving after having
drunk three glasses of tsikoudia, a very strong alcoholic
drink made from pomace.
& Why did John have an accident?
– Concrete: Because he was driving after having
drunk three glasses of tsikoudia.
– Abstract: Because hewas driving after having drunk
three glasses of a very strong alcoholic drink.
– Irrelevant: Because he was driving after having
drunk three glasses of tsikoudia made from
pomace.
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